We provide new evidence on the timing and motives behind earnings management by IPO firms. The period around IPOs is characterized by two distinct events: the IPO itself and the lockup expiration. Both the raising of capital at the time of the IPO and the large-scale exit by pre-IPO shareholders at lockup expiration approximately 180 days later create incentives for firms to engage in earnings management. To disentangle the effect of these two events, we examine quarterly, rather than annual, abnormal accruals. We find no evidence of incomeincreasing earnings management in anticipation of the IPO. However, IPO firms exhibit positive abnormal accruals in the quarter before and the quarter of the lockup expiration. We demonstrate that positive abnormal accruals are concentrated in firms for which we predict intense selling by pre-IPO shareholders at lockup expiration. We also confirm the findings of Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998) that positive abnormal accruals are associated with long-run IPO underperformance.
Introduction
Firms experience significant sales of shares within a short time span around their Initial Public Offering (IPO). First, the firm sells shares to investors at the time of the IPO. Second, approximately six months after the IPO, pre-IPO shareholders reduce or even liquidate their stake in the firm when firm-imposed selling restrictions, known as lockups, expire.
1 Given the high levels of information asymmetry associated with IPO firms, financial reports are a particularly important source of information for new investors when they buy shares at the IPO and, from informed pre-IPO shareholders, at lockup expiration. Thus, strategic earnings management could result in wealth transfers from new investors at each of these two events. In this paper, we provide evidence that IPO firms manage earnings around the lockup expiration in response to the selling incentives of pre-IPO shareholders.
Prior research examines earnings management around IPOs, with mixed results. In an influential study, Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998) document high abnormal accruals in the year firms go public and interpret their findings as evidence of earnings management to inflate the issue price at the IPO. 2 More recent studies (Ball and Shivakumar 2008; Armstrong, Foster and Taylor 2015) question whether IPO firms manipulate earnings. Ball and Shivakumar (2008) argue that firms are subject to intense scrutiny during the IPO process and, consistent with that, find no evidence of earnings management prior to the IPO. Armstrong et al. (2015) confirm the evidence of positive abnormal accruals in the IPO year but are unable to link these accruals to trading incentives of officers and directors. These later studies shifted the interpretation of positive abnormal accruals in the IPO firms from opportunistic earnings management to normal 1 Lockup agreements are voluntary contracts between the underwriter and pre-IPO shareholders that restrict the ability of pre-IPO shareholders to sell their shares in the IPO firm for a specified period of time after the offering, typically 180 days. After lockup expiration there is significant selling by influential pre-IPO shareholders (Field and Hanka 2001) .
2 Several other studies also find evidence of strategic financial reporting behavior at IPO firms (Aharony, Lin and Loeb 1993 , Friedland 1994 , Teoh, Wong and Rao 1998 , Fedyk, Singer and Soliman 2013 economic activity. We argue that it is important to disentangle the two distinct and important events-the IPO and the lockup expiration-to isolate the effects of (i) incentives to manage the IPO price, and (ii) selling incentives at lockup expiration, while controlling for economic changes around the IPO.
We depart from prior literature in two important ways. First, prior studies focus on annual accruals or aggregate accruals over multiple quarters and consequently cannot discern whether abnormal accruals arise because of cash infusion at the IPO or incentives at the lockup expiration date. In contrast to these studies we examine quarterly abnormal accruals around both the IPO and the lockup expiration. This enables us to pinpoint the timing of abnormal accruals and to relate it to the relevant explanation. Second, prior studies use officers' and directors' trading behavior to capture selling incentives around IPO (Armstrong et al. 2015) . However, stringent insider trading regulation and high scrutiny of IPO firms likely deter managers from earnings management for their own benefit. Ertimur, Sletten and Sunder (2014) highlight the importance of selling incentives of pre-IPO shareholders other than managers after lockup expiration. To make a conclusive case for strategic earnings management, we relate the incentives of these pre-IPO shareholders to abnormal accruals before lockup expiration.
We conjecture that IPO firms manage earnings before the lockup expiration, not before the IPO, because pre-IPO shareholders can sell or distribute their holdings only upon lockup expiration. 3 Thus their gains are increased by inflating the stock price at lockup expiration, rather than at the IPO, which affects the proceeds to the offering firm. While managers may also have incentives to use earnings management to inflate the issue price, studies after Teoh et al. (1998a and 1998b) argue that the extensive scrutiny of financial statements reported in the prospectus discourages this (Ball and Shivakumar 2008; Venkataraman, Weber and Willenborg 2008) .
Indeed, these studies provide evidence that firms report conservatively in the year before going public.
Using a comprehensive sample of IPO firms that went public from 1990 through 2013, we first examine quarterly abnormal accruals around the IPO issue date in a univariate setting.
Because IPO proceeds can significantly change a firm's total assets, as suggested by Ball and Shivakumar (2008), we use the average total assets from the current and the previous fiscal period to deflate accruals. We do not find evidence of positive abnormal accruals in the quarter immediately preceding the IPO. Our conclusions are thus consistent with prior studies that examine annual accruals from the year before the IPO (Ball and Shivakumar 2008; Venkataraman et al. 2008) .
Next, we turn our attention to the lockup expiration and, as predicted, find positive abnormal accruals in the quarter preceding and in the quarter of the lockup expiration. Then, using a panel data of firm-quarters that start after the IPO and span the lockup expiration quarter, we compare abnormal accruals around the lockup expiration with those from other quarters in our multivariate tests. This enables us to test for significant spikes in abnormal accruals at opportune times while accounting for the typical magnitudes of abnormal accruals for a given IPO firm. We also control for various firm characteristics that may affect accruals including IPO proceeds (which captures the role of cash infusion in working capital investments). In line with our univariate analyses, these multivariate tests provide evidence of significant positive abnormal accruals in the quarter before and the quarter of the lockup expiration.
To the extent that positive abnormal accruals in the quarter before and the quarter of the lockup expiration stem from earnings management activities, we expect our documented patterns to be less pronounced for more visible firms. Because they are subject to greater scrutiny, earnings management by these firms is more likely to be detected. Newly public firms also face higher than average litigation risk (Lowry and Shu 2002) , increasing the potential costs of earnings management. Visible firms are likely more vulnerable to this risk. We partition sample firms into two groups based on visibility (as captured by firm size and analyst following) and find evidence of higher abnormal accruals in the quarter before and the quarter of the lockup expiration only among the less visible firms.
If IPO firms manage earnings before the lockup expiration in anticipation of share sales or distributions by pre-IPO shareholders, we expect a positive relation between abnormal accruals in the quarter preceding lockup expiration and the selling incentives of pre-IPO shareholders. We document this using an ex ante measure of selling incentives: predicted abnormal trading volume upon lockup expiration. Following Field and Hanka (2001), we employ a number of variables known ahead of lockup expiration to estimate a model of abnormal trading volume immediately after the expiration. The predicted value from this model is our ex ante measure of the selling incentives of pre-IPO shareholders. This measure has three advantages.
(1) It is based on factors known to managers when they decide whether to manage earnings. (2) It eliminates the need for using actual post-lockup-expiration sales by pre-IPO shareholders, which are not readily available. (3) It mitigates reverse-causality concerns associated with actual sales (i.e., pre-IPO shareholders sell shares when artificially inflated earnings result in higher stock price). 4 We find evidence of positive abnormal accruals only when pre-IPO shareholders are predicted by the model to sell. Thus we not only provide evidence of positive abnormal 4 While predicted abnormal trading volume is typically not synonymous with selling incentives, it is an appropriate proxy in our setting, because the additional trading volume after lockup expiration has been attributed to selling of previously locked up shares (Field and Hanka 2001) . The alternative proxy, realized sales by pre-IPO shareholders, is not only undesirable because of endogeneity concerns but also infeasible. Shares in IPO firms are typically held by a variety of shareholders, many of whom are not required to report changes in ownership to the SEC on Form 4. accruals at an opportune time but also link these accruals to an incentive for earnings management: inflating the selling price when pre-IPO shareholders sell shares.
In additional analyses, we do not find a relation between abnormal accruals in the quarter before lockup expiration and incidence of net selling of shares by officers. Thus managers do not seem to inflate earnings to benefit from the trades personally, perhaps because of particularly high litigation risk associated with "pumping and dumping." Instead, their decision to inflate earnings is likely influenced by large, powerful pre-IPO shareholders and by the desire to maintain a positive outlook for the company at the time of expected high selling pressure.
Next we turn our attention to what motivates earnings management in the quarter of the lockup expiration. We investigate two possible explanations for this finding. First, firms may continue to inflate earnings in the quarter of lockup expiration to prevent earnings management from unravelling too quickly and attracting scrutiny. Inconsistent with this explanation, we find a negative autocorrelation between abnormal accruals in the quarter before and the quarter of the lockup expiration.
Second, firms may manage earnings in the quarter of lockup expiration only when pre-IPO shareholders cannot sell enough shares between lockup expiration date and the next quarterly earnings announcement. Many firms impose so-called "blackout" restrictions on trading by insiders. Influential pre-IPO shareholders, such as venture capitalists, angel investors and private equity funds, commonly serve on boards of directors, potentially subjecting them to blackouts. Blackouts typically begin at or before the end of the fiscal quarter and end after earnings are announced. 5 When the period between lockup expiration and the fiscal period-end is not sufficiently long, pre-IPO shareholders will have to postpone most of their selling to the subsequent quarter. Thus, in these cases, we expect earnings management to shift from the quarter before lockup expiration to the quarter afterward. Our evidence confirms this conjecture.
We find this. The shift in positive abnormal accruals from the quarter before to the quarter of lockup expiration, depending on when trading is likely to happen, underlines the importance of selling incentives in earning management around lockup expiration.
Finally, we re-examine the role of earnings management in explaining long-run IPO underperformance (Teoh et al. 1998a ). On one hand, if high abnormal accruals before lockup expiration stem from earnings management, we expect the accruals to eventually reverse, leading to long-run negative abnormal returns. On the other hand, if the abnormal accruals result from the growth of IPO firms, we would not expect to find a significant association between abnormal accruals and long-run underperformance. We partition firms into two groups based on the magnitude of abnormal accruals in the quarter before lockup expiration and calculate valueweighted buy-and hold returns adjusted for size, industry, and market-to-book for firms in each group. Based on traditional as well as bootstrapped p-values that adjust for distributional biases with long-run returns, we find that firms with high accruals earn significantly negative returns over the one, two, and three years following lockup expiration. Firms with low accruals do not experience significantly negative returns, and the difference in returns between the two groups is significant over all windows. These results persist after we consider the effect of low cash flows on long-run underperformance, documented by Armstrong et al. (2015) .
To summarize, our results suggest that firms manage their earnings around the lockup expiration, rather than before the IPO, to enable pre-IPO shareholders to sell their shares at more favorable prices. We find evidence of positive abnormal accruals only when pre-IPO shareholders are expected to sell shares; the timing of these accruals shifts depends on when the sales are likely to happen. We also show that firms seem to consider litigation risk and market scrutiny when making reporting choices: visible firms do not manage earnings.
We therefore unify the seemingly contradictory findings in the literature and contribute to the debate on whether firms manage earnings around the IPO. Consistent with studies that question the ability of firms to manage their earnings given the heightened market scrutiny around IPOs (e.g., Ball and Shivakumar 2008; Armstrong et al. 2015) , we show that firms do not report aggressively before stock issuance. In contrast to these studies, we document a positive relation between abnormal accruals after the IPO and firms' incentives to influence the stock price at the lockup expiration, when pre-IPO shareholders exit. Our evidence indicates that the earnings management explanation is distinct and incremental to the systematic fluctuations in abnormal accruals that result from the investment of IPO proceeds in working capital. On balance, our study supports the contention of Teoh et al. (1998a and 1998b ) that the abnormal accruals in the IPO year are (at least partially) driven by earnings management. However, it also goes beyond prior literature by providing novel evidence that earnings management happens in response to pre-IPO shareholders' selling incentives. et al. (1998a and 1998b) provide evidence of high abnormal accruals in the year firms go public. They propose that earnings management at the time of the offering results in buyers paying too high a price and that ultimately, as more information about the firm is released by the media, financial analysts and subsequent financial reports, the firm experiences a price correction. Teoh et al. (1998a and 1998b) recognize that measuring accruals using pre-IPO data would be ideal to empirically support earnings management to inflate the issue price but, as a result of scant data availability, they focus on the IPO year accruals instead, presumably to capture the effects of some pre-IPO quarters.
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Subsequent studies question the findings in Teoh et al. (1998a and 1998b) and provide evidence suggesting that intense scrutiny applied to a firm's prospectus makes firms report less, not more aggressively in the year prior to IPO (Ball and Shivakumar 2008; Venkataraman et al. 2008 In light of the mixed conclusions from prior literature, to determine whether IPO firms purposefully inflate their financial performance it is necessary to: (1) clearly identify the timing of abnormal accruals relative to the IPO and lockup expiration, and (2) demonstrate that positive abnormal accruals at IPO firms relate to a specific incentive for earnings management, while appropriately controlling for the IPO proceeds. In our research design we address the first issue by analyzing quarterly abnormal accruals starting the quarter before the IPO and extending well into the firm's existence as a public company. The use of quarterly accruals allows us to separately examine the effects of two distinct events-the IPO and the lockup expiration. To address the second challenge listed above, we examine the effect of selling incentives around lockup expiration on abnormal accruals.
Impending sales by pre-IPO shareholders incentivize managers to present a positive image of the firm's financial performance in anticipation of the lockup expiration. Managers are likely to be swayed by large shareholders interests. These shareholders provide funding and advice starting from the early stages of the firm's development and often occupy board positions, influencing managerial compensation and career outcomes (Hellmann and Puri 2000, 2002) .
Even in the absence of pre-IPO shareholders' direct influence, managers may choose to inflate earnings because it helps to ensure sufficient demand from new shareholders to absorb the dramatic increase in the supply of shares at lockup expiration. In contrast, executives are unlikely to pursue earnings management for their own trading profits, as they are subject to strong litigation risk. Consistent with litigation making the strategy of managers' inflating earnings for their own benefit much less attractive, executives sell infrequently and only small quantities after lockup expiration (Ertimur et al. 2014 ).
While there is a clear incentive to manage earnings around lockup expiration, it is likely mitigated by scrutiny from investors, regulators and financial intermediaries. Earnings management at the largest firms or firms followed by the largest number of analysts can be detected more easily and so the costs of inflating financial performance for these firms likely outweigh the benefits. Consequently, we do not expect to find evidence of earnings management at the largest firms and at firms most intensely followed by analysts.
Finally, in the light of conflicting conclusions from prior literature, we re-visit the issue of whether abnormal accruals can explain long-run IPO underperformance. Teoh et al. (1998a) document a link between abnormal accruals in the IPO year and negative stock returns over longer time horizons but Armstrong et al. (2015) question their evidence and conclude that longrun underperformance is largely driven by firms with low cash-flows rather than abnormally high accruals. If the abnormal accruals before lockup expiration result in inflated stock prices, we would expect negative returns as the accruals reverse over time, even after taking into account the cash flow effect documented by Armstrong et al. (2015) . However, if the accruals merely reflect the IPO firms' new ability to invest in working capital, we would not expect a systematic reversal and associated negative long run returns. Thus, an association between high accruals in the quarter before lockup expiration and long-run underperformance following the lockup expiration would further confirm our thesis of earnings management in response to selling incentives around lockup expiration.
Sample
To construct a sample of IPO companies we proceed as follows. We first retrieve all initial public offerings from SDC over the 1990 -2013 period. 7 We obtain offer dates from the "Founding dates for 9,902 IPOs from 1975 -2014 (updated April 14, 2014 " dataset provided by Jay Ritter and rely on these offer dates when there is a divergence between the SDC issue date and the offer date from Ritter. We retain IPOs with issue/offer dates within 30 days of the start date of price data on CRSP. As in Loughran and Ritter (2004), we focus on IPOs with an offer price of at least $5.00 and exclude ADRs, unit offers, closed-end funds, REITs, banks, S&Ls and stocks not listed on CRSP (i.e., Amex, NYSE and NASDAQ). We impose the following additional sample selection criteria: (1) lockup expiration date is available and lockup expiration is not confounded by the effect of an earnings announcement (i.e. earnings announcement does not fall within the three days starting on the lockup expiration date), and (2) the lockup period does not exceed two years, to avoid the impact of confounding events over such a long horizon.
To correctly identify the quarter that we expect to be subject to earnings management, we require the earnings announcement date for the quarter immediately preceding lockup expiration.
We use the abnormal accruals from the modified cross-sectional Jones (1991) model (Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney 1995) . First, we estimate the following specification for each industry (based on two-digit SIC codes), fiscal quarter and fiscal year 8 : Next, we calculate expected and abnormal accruals for our sample firms as follows: Since abnormal accruals are our primary variable of interest, we require their availability for a given firm-quarter to be included in our analyses. After imposing this restriction, there are 11, 605 firm-quarters (corresponding to 3,417 IPOs) available for our univariate examination of abnormal accruals around the IPO issue date ("IPO sample"). This sample includes quarters starting from the quarter before the quarter that includes the IPO and ending four quarters after the IPO quarter. Figure 1 depicts the timeline of event quarters relative to the IPO for this sample.
We then construct another sample -a sample of firm-quarters relative to the quarter which includes the lockup expiration ("lockup expiration sample"). This sample includes all quarters starting two quarters before and ending four quarters after the quarter of lockup expiration, as long as the quarters fall after the IPO date. For this sample, we also require the availability of all control variables necessary for our multivariate analysis and listed in Section 4.1. The final number of quarters in our lockup expiration sample is 10,778 (corresponding to 2,666 IPOs). Figure 2 depicts the timeline of event quarters relative to the lockup expiration for this sample.
We provide descriptive statistics on the lockup expiration sample characteristics in Table   1 . The average quarterly abnormal accruals scaled by average total assets are positive at 0.001 but we observe significant variation from -0.028 at the first quartile to 0.034 at the third quartile.
The IPO firms in our sample are small growth firms with total assets of $393 million, return on assets of -2.3%, sales growth of 33.5% and book-to-market of 0.519. The average IPO proceeds are 91% of average assets and 42% of the sample is backed by venture capitalists; both statistics are comparable to those reported in Armstrong et al. (2015) . The mean institutional ownership is 28%, similar to that reported by Field and Lowry (2009) . We find that our sample firms have an analyst following of about 2.7 on average. However, there is significant variation in the level of market scrutiny because the first quartile of analyst following is zero and the first quartile of institutional ownership is less than 10%.
Research Design and Results
Timing of Earnings Management in IPO firms
We begin by examining quarterly abnormal accruals around the first of the two key dates for IPO firms-the IPO issue date. We identify the "announcement quarter" in which the IPO falls, Quarter IPO , and define event quarters relative to Quarter IPO (see Figure 1) . 10 If IPO firms manage earnings to maximize the proceeds from the IPO, we will observe income-increasing accruals in Quarter IPO-1 , i.e., the latest quarter with an earnings announcement before the IPO issue date. This is because for earnings management to influence investors' assessment of the firm value at the time of the offering, earnings has to be publicly announced by the issue date. In contrast, earnings for Quarter IPO are announced only after the issue date, by which time it is too late to influence the IPO price. Next, we turn our attention to quarterly abnormal accruals around the second of the two key dates for IPO firms and the main focus of this study-the IPO lockup expiration date. We denote the announcement quarter in which the lockup expiration falls as Quarter Lockup (see Figure   2 ). Our focus is abnormal accruals in Quarter Lockup-1 . The earnings for this quarter are the last earnings information investors observe before the expiration of the lockup period. Quarter Lockup+4 relative to lockup expiration). These quarters constitute our benchmark, allowing us to evaluate whether accruals depart from normal levels in time-series, and not just vary crosssectionally.
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We control for a number of variables that are likely to affect accruals: firm size, sales growth, book to market ratio, return on assets, and operating cycle (Fairfied, Whisenant, and firm's ability to manage earnings is likely to be more limited in that quarter (Baginski and Hasell 1990; Roychowdhury and Sletten 2012) . Our regressions include a number of variables that capture institutional characteristics: VC backing, percentage of institutional investors holding shares in the firm and a dual class status of the shares. Finally, we control for IPO proceeds to address the concerns put forward by Ball and Shivakumar (2008) and Armstrong et al. (2015) that high abnormal accruals post-IPO can result from the investment of IPO proceeds in the working capital. Our multivariate results can thus be interpreted as testing whether accruals are unusually high even after controlling for the effect of IPO proceeds. We include year fixed effects and cluster standard errors by fiscal year and quarter. See Appendix A for detailed descriptions of control variables. Importantly, even after controlling for that link, there is evidence of higher accruals in the quarter prior to and the quarter of lockup expiration.
The Effect of Scrutiny on Earnings Management in IPO Firms
As we discuss above, if the positive abnormal accruals in the quarter before and the quarter of the lockup expiration stem from earnings management activities, we expect the documented patterns to be less pronounced for more visible firms, which are subject to higher levels of market scrutiny. To examine this conjecture, we estimate a modified version of Equation (1) 1% of the firm's average quarterly assets, while abnormal accruals at firms classified as subject to high scrutiny represent less than 0.1% of the average assets. Overall, these results suggest that the positive abnormal accruals in the quarter prior to and the quarter of lockup expiration are evidence of earnings management in IPO firms.
The Role of Selling Incentives
We conjecture that the positive abnormal accruals in the quarter preceding lockup expiration result from earnings management to benefit pre-IPO shareholders who exit the firm upon lockup expiration. If that is indeed the case, we should observe a positive relation between accruals in the quarter preceding lockup expiration and the intensity of selling incentives of pre-IPO shareholders.
In our analyses so far we use event time indicators to proxy for the presence of selling incentives. In this section, we allow for cross-sectional variation in the intensity of selling trading volume on the lockup expiration day and the following day. All variables are defined in detail in Appendix A. We estimate this model for the sample of IPO firms for which all the above variables are available-see Appendix B for the estimation results. We then use the coefficients from this model to construct predicted abnormal trading volume for each firm in our final sample.
To examine whether positive abnormal accruals in the quarter before lockup expiration are related to selling incentives, we modify equation (1) The results in Table 5 are consistent with our expectations-the coefficient on High
Selling Incentives x Quarter Lockup-1 is positive and significant while the coefficient on Low
Selling Incentives x Quarter Lockup-1 is insignificant. The two coefficients are also significantly different from each other with a p-value of 0.05. These results point to a link between positive abnormal accruals in the quarter before lockup expiration and selling incentives of pre-IPO shareholders.
As discussed before, given particularly high litigation risk associated with "pumping and dumping," we do not expect managers to benefit personally from inflating the stock price around lockup expiration (Ertimur et al. 2014) . Nevertheless, for completeness, we examine the potential effect of managers' personal selling incentives in our next set of tests. We conjecture that if managers use earnings management in the current quarter to influence the price at which they trade in the subsequent quarter, earnings management in any given quarter is influenced by managers' insider trading plans for the next quarter. 13 Accordingly, we supplement equation (1) with: (1) The results, reported in Table 6 , provide evidence of significant positive abnormal accruals in the quarter before lockup expiration when there is no insider trading activity. 
Earnings Management in the Quarter of Lockup Expiration
Consistent with our expectations, the analyses in Tables 2 and 3 We try to understand this substitution further by relating the timing of abnormal accruals to selling restrictions (explanation (2) proposed at the beginning of this section). First, insider sales are subject to volume limitations of Rule 144. 15 Second, diversifying shareholders may prefer to execute a number of smaller trades, potentially spread over more than one quarter, to avoid a negative price impact from their sales. Finally, many firms have "blackout" provisions which prevent insiders from selling shares when in possession of material private information, typically between the fiscal period end and the earnings announcement (Jagolinzer, Larcker and Taylor 2011). These provisions may not apply to all pre-IPO shareholders but many influential shareholders such as VCs, angel, private equity and institutional investors are represented on boards, making their status ambiguous and potentially preventing them from selling during blackouts. We thus take into consideration the duration of the period during which pre-IPO shareholders are typically able to sell shares-from the lockup expiration date to the fiscal period end date (when blackout restrictions usually start) for the same quarter. When this period is short, pre-IPO shareholders may have to shift (some of) their trades to the subsequent quarter (Quarter Lockup+1 ). This would make the lockup quarter earnings relevant for influencing the stock price at which pre-IPO shareholders exit.
To examine this explanation empirically, we partition firm-lockup quarter observations into two based on pre-IPO shareholders' ability to sell shares in the lockup expiration quarter (i.e. based on the share price that reflects earnings news from the quarter before lockup expiration The results of this estimation, reported in Table 7 Quarter Lockup-1 is not statistically significant. Because data on the specific blackout periods for each company is not available, our proxy captures trading restrictions with some measurement error. Overall, our findings indicate that IPO firms inflate earnings ahead of the quarter when pre-IPO shareholder sales are likely.
Earnings Management and Long-Run Stock Performance
The incentive to manage earnings in anticipation of sales by pre-IPO shareholders implies that positive abnormal accruals result in inflated stock prices. If high abnormal accruals cause the stock price at the time of lockup expiration to be overstated relative to its fundamental value, then over time, as information about the firm's true earnings arrives, the stock price will decline, resulting in negative returns. Consequently, firms with high abnormal accruals in Quarter will have lower long-run returns compared to firms with low abnormal accruals. We form two sub-samples based on whether the abnormal accruals in Quarter Lockup-1 are above or below the median. For each sub-sample, we compute the long-run abnormal buy-and-hold returns over 12, 24 and 36 months starting in the month following the lockup expiration. We compute the abnormal returns as the value-weighted average monthly size-and book-to-market-adjusted buyand-hold returns.
18 Table 8 , Panel A reports these returns. We find significant negative abnormal buy-andhold returns over the one-year period after lockup expiration for firms with high abnormal accruals in Quarter Lockup-1 . Moreover, negative and significant returns persist for these firms over longer windows (24 and 36 months). In contrast, abnormal returns over the 24-and 36-month periods are not significantly different from zero for the sub-sample of firms with low abnormal 18 In untabulated tests, we also compute equal-weighted average abnormal buy-and-hold returns and the inferences are unchanged. accruals and significantly positive over the 12-month period. Finally, long-run returns for firms with high and low abnormal accruals are significantly different from each other.
We address the potential misspecification of tests for long-run returns (Kothari and Warner 1997; Barber and Lyon 1997) in two ways. First, following Mitchell and Stafford (2000) and Bhojraj, Hribar, Picconi and McInnis (2009), we calculate bootstrapped p-values.
Specifically, we match each observation in the sample to another firm in the CRSP/Compustat universe (with replacement) in the same year and size-, book-to-market category from the Compustat/CRSP. This results in a control sample with similar size and book-to-market characteristics and dispersion in calendar time. We repeat this process 1,000 times, resulting in 1,000 control samples. We then calculate buy-and-hold-return for each one of the 1,000 control samples, yielding an empirical distribution for the buy-and-hold-returns. The bootstrapped pvalue represents the proportion of buy-and-hold returns from the control samples that are larger in magnitude, but of the same sign, as the buy-and-hold returns of the event sample. We bootstrap standard errors and continue to find significantly negative abnormal buy-and-hold returns for firms with above-median abnormal accruals across all three return windows. In contrast, the buy-and-hold returns for firms with below-median abnormal accruals are not statistically different from zero for any of the time horizons. The difference in long run abnormal returns between the two groups is statistically significant in all cases.
Second, we use the calendar time portfolio approach to calculate returns. We group firms into portfolios (separately for those with above and below median abnormal accruals in
Quarter Lockup-1 ) by event month. A given firm enters the portfolio for all months that fall in the window for long-run returns computation. For example, when we calculate calendar-time abnormal returns for one year after the lockup, a given firm is included in the portfolio in each of the 12 months that follows its lockup expiration. Following the practice in prior literature, we require at least five firms in each monthly portfolio and, as a result, lose a significant fraction of observations. Further, because IPOs are not evenly distributed in time, we disproportionately drop IPOs from certain cold IPO markets. Given the limited sample, we treat this approach only as a robustness test. We regress the calendar portfolio excess returns (value-weighted monthly returns) on the momentum and three Fama-French factors. The intercept or alpha is the measure of average abnormal monthly returns in the first year following lockup expiration. We find that the portfolio alpha is negative and significant for the first 12 months following the lockup expiration. The negative returns in the 12 months following lockup taken together with the abnormal accruals reversal documented in Quarter Lockup+4 in Table 2 suggest that the negative returns are driven by the reversal of the earnings management from before lockup expiration.
However, we no longer observe significant abnormal returns over the 24-and 36-month horizon.
Finally, we address the concern that the relation between high accruals and negative longrun returns is driven by low cash flows generated by firms with high accruals (Armstrong et al. 2015) . We split the subsample of firms with high accruals into two groups based on the median cash flow from operations. If the documented negative long-run returns are driven by cash flows alone, we would find significant negative returns for firms with high accruals only in the subsample with below median cash flows. Instead, as reported in Table 8 , Panel B, we find significant negative long-run returns both in the high cash flow and in the low cash flow group providing reassurance that high accruals in Quarter Lockup-1 indeed affect the long run returns after lockup expiration. For completeness, we also report the results for the subsample of firms with below median accruals. We do not observe any significant abnormal returns in that subsample.
Conclusion
In this study we examine quarterly abnormal accruals of newly public firms around the Table 6   Table 6 reports results from an OLS estimation of equation (1) Table 7   Table 7 reports results from an OLS estimation of equation (1) 
Figure 2 -Timeline of Announcement Quarters Relative to Lockup Expiration
